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NOTE
SECTION 2259 RESTITUTION CLAIMS AND CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSION
Dina McLeod*
In 2009, a child pornography victim brought a criminal restitution
claim against a defendant who possessed images of her abuse. The
statutory provision authorizing restitution, 18 U.S.C. § 2259, had
never before been used to bring a claim against a defendant who
had only possessed, rather than produced or distributed, child
pornography ("child pornography possession defendants"). The fed-
eral courts have not developed a consistent approach to resolving
Section 2259 claims involving such defendants.
This Note argues that two conceptions of traditional proximate
cause doctrine can provide a framework for analyzing such claims.
It examines Section 2259 claims using both a policy-based view of
proximate causation and a view based on the relationship between
the victim and the defendant. This Note concludes that, using either
approach, current Section 2259 claims against child pornography
possession defendants fail to prove proximate causation.
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INTRODUCTION
On March 27, 2008, Alan Hesketh was charged with possessing, receiv-
ing, and distributing hundreds of images of child pornography.' Seven
months later, his prosecution took an unexpected turn.2 An abuse victim de-
picted in some of the images possessed by Mr. Hesketh requested restitution
from the defendant under a provision in the Violence Against Women Act.
In the restitution hearing, Senior Judge Warren Eginton of the District
Court of Connecticut noted, "This is an unusual case."4 The court explained:
[I]t does not appear that any court has ever awarded restitution for offenses
involving sexual exploitation of children or child pornography, when the
defendant did not also participate in this sexual exploitation of the chil-
dren. On the contrary, in every case in which a court awarded restitution,
the defendant also participated in the sexual exploitation that produced the
material ... .
The abuse victim, now in her twenties, identified herself as Amy.6 Amy
claimed that people who viewed images of her abuse were responsible for
1. Criminal Complaint at 1, United States v. Hesketh, No. 3:08-CR-00165 (WWE) (D.
Conn. Mar. 27, 2008); Pfizer Patent Chief Charged with Distributing Child Pornography, Associ-
ATED PREss, Mar. 28, 2008, available at 3/28/08 APALERTCT 10:24:11 (Westlaw).
2. See Defendant Alan Hesketh's Memorandum in Opposition to Restitution, United States
v. Hesketh, No. 3:08-CR-00165 (WWE) (D. Conn. Oct. 13, 2008).
3. See id. See generally Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. 4,
ch. 1, 108 Stat. 1902, 1904-10 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 42 U.S.C.
(1994)).
4. Transcript of Restitution Hearing at 3, United States v. Hesketh, No. 3:08-CR-00165
(WWE) (D. Conn. Feb. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Transcript of Hesketh Restitution Hearing].
5. Id. at 23.
6. Casey Knaupp, Attorney for Victim Asks for $3.4 million, TYLER MORNING TELEGRAPH, Aug.
21, 2009, http://tpstage.sx.atl.publicus.com/article/20090821/NEWSO8/908210317/0/OPINIONOI.
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her perpetual revictimization. She sought approximately $3.4 million to pay
8for her therapy costs and to compensate her for any future loss of wages.
Judge Eginton agreed that the defendant had caused some compensable
harm to the victim and ordered a restitution award of $200,000.9 The defen-
dant settled with Amy for $130,000.o Amy continues, however, to seek
restitution from hundreds of defendants in the federal court system." She is
one of thousands of identified child pornography victims who may seek res-
titution under the same provision in the Violence Against Women Act.12
This Note addresses the legal question presented by this novel restitution
claim: Should child pornography possession defendants be held liable for
damages 3 to the individuals depicted in the images they possess? The Vio-
lence Against Women Act 4 authorizes restitution for victims of child
pornography possession. But until recently, no individuals had pressed such
claims against child pornography possession defendants. '5 District court
judges have been unable to develop a consistent framework for addressing
the underlying issue: whether the link between child pornography posses-
sion and the harm to child pornography victims is strong enough to support
a claim for damages.
This Note argues that classic proximate causation doctrine, as developed
in the seminal Palsgraf decision, does not support the application of 18
U.S.C. § 2259 ("Section 2259") to child pornography possessors. This Note
does not dispute that victims of child pornography suffer serious injuries
from their abuse, but rather questions the legal sufficiency of the link be-
tween the child pornography possessor and the victim. Part I examines the
relevant statutory provision and the inconsistency of federal district courts in
applying it. Part II introduces the policy-based proximate cause framework
7. Warren Richey, A Bold Gambit to Reduce Demand for Child Porn, CHRISTIAN Sa. MON-
ITOR, Aug. 8, 2009, http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0808/p22s01 -usju.html.
8. Knaupp, supra note 6.
9. Transcript of Hesketh Restitution Hearing, supra note 4, at 47.
10. Richey, supra note 7.
11. Knaupp, supra note 6. James Marsh, who serves as Amy's counsel, has sent out ap-
proximately 250 restitution requests to "probably every district in the country." Id.
12. Id. ("According to national statistics, out of about 26 million images of child pornogra-
phy, there are more than 2,000 identified victims, with 80 percent of those in the United States.").
13. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2259 (2006). Section 2259 is titled "Mandatory Restitution,"
but in this context "restitution" most closely means "damages." The civil understanding of restitu-
tion as disgorging the benefits unjustly received by the defendant would have little meaning here.
Accordingly, this Note uses the terms "restitution" and "damages" interchangeably. See Alan T.
Harland, Monetary Remedies for the Victims of Crime: Assessing the Role of the Criminal Courts,
30 UCLA L. REv. 52, 64 (1982); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST EN-
RICHMENT § I cmt. a (Discussion Draft 2000).
14. See Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. 4, ch. 1, 108 Stat.
1902 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 42 U.S.C. (1994)); 18 U.S.C. § 2259
(2006).
15. See John Schwartz, Child Pornography, and an Issue of Restitution, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,
2010, at Al9.
16. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
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advocated by Judge Andrews's Palsgraf dissent and explores the policy rea-
sons for refusing to extend civil-type" liability to child pornography
possession defendants. Part III discusses the relational theory of proximate
cause developed in Judge Cardozo's majority opinion in Palsgraf and argues
that the relationship between a particular child pornography possessor and
the particular individual depicted in the illicit image does not support liabil-
ity for damages. Part III argues that the crime of child pornography
possession is analogous to the tort of defamation and concludes that the di-
vergent manner in which these two areas of law treat possession suggests
that child pornography possession is criminalized because of a general re-
vulsion and fear of those who possess such images, not because of harms
caused to specific victims. Part IV argues that civil tort or restitution claims
provide several advantages for child pornography victims seeking civil re-
dress and concludes that such victims should seek a remedy in the civil
system.
I. APPLYING SECTION 2259: THE LEGAL QUESTION
Section 2259 requires a judge to order restitution for certain losses suf-
fered by victims of child pornography possession offenses (and a range of
other child sexual exploitation offenses).'" Courts must determine whether
the victim was harmed "as a result of' the offense." However, courts have
not yet developed a consistent approach to addressing when a victim was
harmed "as a result of' the crime, at least when applying Section 2259 to
those defendants convicted only of child pornography possession. The hesi-
tancy of some judges in awarding this type of restitution evinces a concern
with the potential difficulty in administering such claims, as well as a con-
cern that the causal link between the victim's harm and the defendant's
conduct is too tenuous.20
A. The Statute: Section 2259
Victims may seek restitution pursuant to the Mandatory Restitution for
Sex Crimes section of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, which
mandates restitution for certain offenses relating to the sexual exploitation
of children.2' Possession of child pornography is a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)(4)(B) (knowingly possessing, or knowingly accessing with intent
17. Courts are split on the question whether "criminal restitution" is essentially criminal
(punitive) or civil (compensatory) in nature. See Matthew Spohn, Note, A Statutory Chameleon: The
Mandatory Victim Restitution Act's Challenge to the Civil/Criminal Divide, 86 IowA L. REv. 1013,
1015-16 (2001).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 2259 (2006).
19. Id. § 2259(c).
20. For a discussion of this point, see infra Section I.C.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(a) (2006).
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to view, child pornography).22 This violation falls plainly within the scope of
Section 2259, which applies to "any offense under this chapter [18 U.S.C.
§§ 2251-2260]."3
Section 2259 states that "the court shall order restitution" for any appli-
cable offense and "shall direct the defendant to pay the victim ... the full
amount of the victim's losses"2 The statute defines a "victim" as "the indi-
vidual harmed as a result of a commission of a crime under this chapter [18
U.S.C. §§ 2251-2260]"2 It provides that the "full amount of the victim's
losses" include any costs incurred by the victim for:
(A) medical services relating to physical, psychiatric, or psychological care;
(B) physical and occupational therapy or rehabilitation;
(C) necessary transportation, temporary housing, and child care expenses;
(D) lost income;
(E) attorneys' fees, as well as other costs incurred; and
(F) any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the of-
fense.26
The statute states that "[t]he issuance of a restitution order under this section
is mandatory."27 It also forbids the court from declining to issue an order due
to "(i) the economic circumstances of the defendant; or (ii) the fact that a
victim has, or is entitled to, receive compensation for his or her injuries
from the proceeds of insurance or any other source."28
Section 2259 restitution orders are issued pursuant to the procedures
21
outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3664. It is noteworthy that the government plays a
necessary role in requesting restitution.30 Thus, a victim cannot bring a resti-
tution claim herself. In practice, victims can send their claims to the
appropriate U.S. Attorney's office and request that a prosecutor present the
claim to the court. For example, Amy's lawyer "has automated the process
22. Id. § 2252(a)(4)(B).
23. Id. § 2259(a).
24. Id. § 2259(a)-(b).
25. Id. § 2259(c).
26. Id. § 2259(b)(3).
27. Id. § 2259(b)(4)(A).
28. Id. § 2259(b)(4)(B)(i)-(ii).
29. Id. § 3664. First, the court orders the probation officer to prepare a presentence report,
which includes, "to the extent practicable, a complete accounting of the losses to each victim, any
restitution owed pursuant to a plea agreement, and information relating to the economic circum-
stances of each defendant." Id. § 3664(a). Then, at least sixty days prior to the sentencing hearing,
the prosecutor provides the probation officer with an itemization of the amounts subject to restitu-
tion. Id. § 3664(d)(1). Finally, the probation officer provides notice to all identified victims of, inter
alia, the defendant's offense, the restitution amount submitted to the probation officer, and the op-
portunity for the victim to submit information to the probation officer regarding the amount subject
to restitution. Id. § 3664(d)(2)(A)(i)-(vi).
30. See id. § 3664(d)(1).
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and e-mailed Amy's filings to United States Attorneys in 350 cases."' How-
ever, the decision to request restitution rests with the government, and
prosecutors may decline to bring the restitution claim.32
B. Applying Section 2259: Inconsistent Results
This seemingly straightforward statutory provision has created serious
inconsistencies in the U.S. district courts when applied to child pornography
offenses that do not involve direct abuse. At least one court has awarded the
full amount of the requested restitution." Other courts have declined to
award any restitution at all.' The outcomes can therefore be placed into two
broad categories: award of restitution" and denial of restitution. A brief
survey of these outcomes will illustrate the difficulty district courts have
faced in developing a coherent approach to this issue.
A few notable trends stand out. First, the cases are geographically di-
verse; the courts that have addressed Section 2259 span the entire country,
from Hawaii to Maine. Second, while restitution awards tend to be on the
31. Schwartz, supra note 15.
32. Id.
33. See United States v. Staples, No. 09-14017-CR, 2009 WL 2827204 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2,
2009) (awarding $3,680,153 to Amy).
34. See, e.g., United States Brief on Restitution at 16 n.66, United States v. Paroline, 672 F.
Supp. 2d 781 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 6:08-CR-61) (citing United States v. Johnson, CR 08-218-01-KI
(D. Or. May 19, 2009)) (noting that the Johnson court refused to award any restitution to Amy).
35. See United States v. Church, 701 E Supp. 2d 814, 835 (W.D. Va. 2010) (nominal restitu-
tion award of $100); United States v. Aumais, No. 08-CR-711, 2010 WL 3033821, at *10 (N.D.N.Y.
Jan. 13, 2010) (restitution award of $48,483); United States v. Brunner, No. 5:08-CR-16, 2010 WL
148433, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 2010) (restitution award of $1,500 for victim "Vicky" and $6,000
for victim "Misty"); United States v. Scheidt, No. 1:07-CR-00293, 2010 WL 144837, at *6 (E.D.
Cal. Jan. 11, 2010) (restitution award of $3,000 per victim); United States v. Hicks, No. 1:09-CR-
150, 2009 WL 4110260, at *6 (E.D. Va. Nov. 24, 2009) (restitution award of $3,525); United States
v. Hyson, 1:09-CR-00305 (E.D. Va. Nov. 13, 2009) (restitution award of $5,000); United States v.
Woodin, 2:09-CR-044 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2009) (restitution award of $1,000); United States v.
Ferenci, No. 1:08-CR-0414 AWl, 2009 WL 2579102, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009) (restitution
award of $3,000); United States v. Renga, No. 1:08-CR-0270, 2009 WL 2579103, at *7 (E.D. Cal.
Aug. 19, 2009) (restitution award of $3,000); United States v. Zane, No. 1:08-CR-0369 AWl, 2009
WL 2567832, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009) (restitution award of $3,000 per victim); United States
v. Monk, No. 1:08-CR-0365 AWl, 2009 WL 2567831, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009) (restitution
award of $3,000 per victim); Staples, 2009 WL 2827204, at *1 (award of $3,680,153); United States
v. Lynn, No. 1:08CR00172-001 (E.D. Cal. July 10, 2009) (restitution award of $750); United States
v. Ochoa, No. 1:08CR00262-001 (E.D. Cal. July 10, 2009) (restitution award of $250); United
States v. Torrey, No. 3:08-CR-00082-001 (S.D. Iowa June 26, 2009) (restitution award of $5,000);
Transcript of Hesketh Restitution Hearing, supra note 4 (restitution award of $200,000).
36. See United States v. Solsbury, No. 4:09-CR-062, 2010 WL 3023913 (D.N.D. Aug. 4,
2010); United States v. Patton, No. 09-43 (PAM/JSM), 2010 WL 1006521 (D. Minn. Mar. 16,
2010); United States v. Woods, 689 E Supp. 2d 1102 (N.D. Iowa 2010); United States v. Van
Brackle, No. 2:08-CR-042-WCO, 2009 WL 4928050 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 2009); Paroline, 672 E
Supp. 2d 781; United States v. Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d 182, 193 (D. Me. 2009); United States v. Si-
mon, No. CR-08-0907 DLJ, 2009 WL 2424673, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2009); Johnson, CR 08-
218-01-KI; Transcript of Proceedings at 6, United States v. Kuba, No. 1:08-CR-00667-JMS (D.
Haw. Aug. 14, 2009).
37. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
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"low" end ($250 to $6,000),3 at least one federal judge has awarded
39$3,680,153, the entire amount requested. In addition, some courts impose a
standard amount of restitution against each defendant convicted of child
pornography possession: "For example, the Central District of California
seems to routinely order restitution of $5,000 while the Eastern District of
California routinely orders restitution of $3,000."" Third, while the cases
where restitution has been awarded outnumber the cases where restitution
has been denied, the district courts that have denied restitution represent a
substantial minority.4' Bolstering the minority position is the Fifth Circuit's
recent decision to uphold the denial of restitution to a child pornography
victim. 42 The Fifth Circuit-the only court of appeals to release an opinion
on a Section 2259 restitution claim relating to child pornography posses-
sion-wrote approvingly of the minority position, noting that the district
court's "Memorandum Opinion and Order reflects careful and thoughtful
consideration of the law and the facts, as well as sensitivity to Amy and oth-
er victims of child pornography."3 This split of authority, the geographic
diversity of claims, and the variance among award amounts, suggest that the
legal issue is widespread and unsettled.
Judges who award restitution have offered similar analyses in reaching
this result. First, these courts have emphasized the "mandatory" nature of
the restitution provision in Section 2259." Second, they have held that the
depicted children constitute "victims" within the meaning of the statute.45
Courts awarding restitution have relied heavily on the Supreme Court's de-
cision in New York v. Ferber, which held that the "use of children as subjects
of pornographic materials is harmful to the physiological, emotional, and
mental health of the child."46 Third, these judges address the most difficult
aspect of the restitution claim: causation. Courts awarding restitution have
generally acknowledged that the main problem for the claimants is proving
the causal connection between the victim's harm and the specific defen-
dant's offense.4 7 Judge Ishii of the Eastern District of California observed
38. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
39. See Staples, 2009 WL 2827204, at * 1.
40. Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 190.
41. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
42. In re Amy, 591 F.3d 792, 793 (5th Cir. 2009). The Fifth Circuit denied Amy's petition for
a writ of mandamus to reconsider the denial of restitution in United States v. Paroline, holding that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying restitution. In re Amy, 591 F.3d at 793.
43. Id. at 795.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Brunner, No. 5:08-CR-16, 2010 WL 148433, at *1 (W.D.N.C.
Jan. 12, 2010); United States v. Scheidt, No. 1:07-CR-00293 AWl, 2010 WL 144837, at *2 (E.D.
Cal. Jan. 8, 2010); United States v. Hicks, No. 1:09-CR-150, 2009 WL 4110260, at *2 (E.D. Va.
Nov. 24, 2009).
45. See, e.g., Brunner, 2010 WL 148433, at *1-2; Scheidt, 201OWL 144837, at *2-3; Hicks,
2009 WL 4110260, at *2-3.
46. 458 U.S. 747, 758 (1982).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Renga, No. 1:08-CR-0270 AWL, 2009 WL 2579103, at *4
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009) ("The problem in this case is with the government's ability to prove the
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that "Section 2259 leaves the court in a legal quandary: The court must
award restitution and the government must show the harm caused by [the
defendant], but it is difficult to determine the amount of harm caused by [the
defendant].' Courts awarding restitution have overcome this problem by
arguing that this causal connection is subject only to a "rule of reasonable-
ness" 49 and need not be pinpointed with "mathematical precision."50
Judges who deny restitution have diverged at this point in the analysis.
They agree that the depicted children are "victims" under the statute."' How-
ever, these judges do not agree that the claimants have proved that any
specific losses were proximately caused by the defendants' conduct.52 Judge
Davis of the Eastern District of Texas pointed out that the "victim" inquiry
and the "proximate cause" inquiry are separate:
[T]he Government is conflating the proximate cause requirement with the
requirement that the victim be harmed as a result of [the defendant's] con-
duct. Certainly, Amy was harmed by [the defendant's] possession of Amy's
two pornographic images, but this does little to show how much of her
harm, or what amount of her losses, was proximately caused by [the de-
fendant's] offense.5 '
Judges who deny restitution have made another key argument: imposi-
tion of restitution in the absence of proof that the defendant's conduct
caused specific losses would likely violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibi-
tion against excessive fines.54 Judge Davis, who held two hearings on this
restitution issue, noted that awarding restitution without proof of specific
losses could require the defendant to pay the victim for losses caused by
others. He observed that "[t]he losses described in Amy's report are gener-
alized and caused by her initial abuse as well as the general existence and
causal connection between Defendant Renga's possession of child pornography and the amount of
harm he caused Victim Vicky."); Transcript of Hesketh Restitution Hearing, supra note 4, at 24
("The proximate cause argument really is a difficult argument to handle in dealing with 2259.").
48. Scheidt, 2010 WL 144837, at *4.
49. See, e.g., Brunner, 2010 WL 148433, at *3; see also Scheidt, 2010 WL 144837, at *4;
Hicks, 2009 WL 4110260, at *4.
50. Brunner, 2010 WL 148433, at *3 (quoting United States v. Doe, 488 F3d 1154, 1159-60
(9th Cir. 2007)).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Patton, No. 09-43 (PAMIJSM), 2010 WL 1006521, at *1 (D.
Minn. Mar. 16, 2010); United States v. Van Brackle, No. 2:08-CR-042-WC, 2009 WL 4928050, at
*2 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 2009); United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 787 (E.D. Tex. 2009);
United States v. Berk, 666 F Supp. 2d 182, 186 (D. Me. 2009).
52. See, e.g., Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 793. This Note agrees with the judges who deny
restitution that specific losses caused by the defendant cannot be proved, but disagrees that the crime
of child pornography possession is designed to protect individual victims. This argument is ad-
dressed in Part IHl.
53. Pamline, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 791.
54. See Patton, 2010 WL 1006521, at *2; Van Brackle, 2009 WL 4928050, at *3; Pamline,
672 F. Supp. 2d at 789; Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 188 n.5.
55. Pamline, 672 F Supp. 2d at 791 ("A victim is not necessarily entitled to restitution for all
of her losses simply because the victim was harmed and sustained some lesser loss as a result of a
defendant's specific conduct.").
1334 [Vol. 109:1327
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,,16dissemination of her pornographic images. Thus, the split between the
two camps hinges on the issue of proving specific losses; judges who award
restitution find it reasonable to estimate the specific losses, while those who
deny restitution do not.
However, the method of estimating the amount of the specific losses has
varied even among those judges who have awarded restitution. Judge Egin-
ton used the minimum damages amount stated in 18 U.S.C. § 2255
("Section 2255"), which outlines the civil remedy for personal injuries."
Section 2255 states that "[a]ny person who, while a minor, was a victim of a
violation of section ... 2252 [or] 2252A .... shall be deemed to have sus-
tained damages of no less than $150,000 in value."" Judge Eginton then
added $50,000 on top of the minimum damages under Section 2255 to cover
attorneys' fees and experts' fees, resulting in a total award of $200,000.59
Judge Ishii also used Section 2255 as a starting point for calculating res-
titution. 0 However, Judge Ishii declined to award $150,000; rather, he noted
that "[r]estitution and the total amount of damages are not always the same
thing."6' The court observed that Section 2255 provides for "deemed dam-
ages in the amount of $150,000 for violations ranging from possession of
child pornography in violation of Section 2252(a)(4)(B), to selling children
for purposes of sexually explicit conduct in violation of Section 2251A, and
to sexual abuse in violation of Section 2242 and Section 2243.",6' The fact
that child pornography possession lies on the less severe end of this spec-
trum suggests that "a defendant who possessed child pornography caused
the victim less than $150,000 in harm." The court then settled on $3,000 (2
percent of $150,000) as the appropriate amount of restitution, but did not
specify why."
Although Judge Voorhees of the Western District of North Carolina used
a similar analysis, he discounted the restitution award to account for the
65 6losses attributable to the original abuse. The court noted that Amy's6 loss
56. Id. at 792.
57. Transcript of Hesketh Restitution Hearing, supra note 4, at 25.
58. 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2006).
59. Transcript of Hesketh Restitution Hearing, supra note 4, at 26-27.
60. United States v. Zane, No. 1:08-CR-0369 AWl, 2009 WL 2567832, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug.
18, 2009).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id. The court stated only that:
mhe court finds an amount less than $3,000 inconsistent with Congress's findings on the
harm to children victims of child pornography. At the same time, the court finds $3,000 is a
level of restitution that the court is confident is somewhat less than the actual harm this par-
ticular defendant caused each victim, resolving any due process concerns.
Id.
65. United States v. Brunner, No. 5:08-CR-16, 2010 WL 148433, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 12,
2010).
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of earnings was primarily the result of her decision to drop out of college,
which was "triggered by a movie she watched with her psychology class
that focused on the plight of abused children." The court found that Amy's
"initial abuse would likely have triggered the same response even without
the continued possession of her image."6 Despite the court's detailed calcu-
lation of the restitution, it is unclear why the court chose to discount the
restitution by any particular amount. In the case of Vicky, the restitution
award was discounted by 50 percent, but the court did not specify why such
a reduction was appropriate.69
Judge O'Grady of the Eastern District of Virginia used the same sort of
analysis for Vicky,0 but offered an additional rationale for the $3,000 award.
Because Vicky sought a total restitution amount of approximately
$150,000,7' and because "[t]he Court believe[d] that at least fifty defendants
will be successfully prosecuted for unlawfully possessing or receiving the
Vicky series," Judge O'Grady reasoned that an award of $3,000 per defen-
dant would compensate Vicky in full.
The examples above demonstrate the inconsistencies that are developing
across the district courts over whether courts should award restitution and, if
so, what method they should use to calculate the restitution amount. Section
I.C will explore why courts struggle to consistently adjudicate Section 2259
restitution claims targeted at child pornography possession defendants.
C. Why Federal Courts Struggle in Applying Section 2259
to Child Pornography Possession Cases
Extending Section 2259 to encompass child pornography possession
convictions has troubled district courts for several reasons. These reasons
have been summarized by Judge Davis, who invited interested parties to
submit briefing to address the following questions:
1. How shall it be determined whether the restitution-claimant is actually
a victim and is entitled to restitution under section 2259?
2. How will the amount of restitution to which an identified victim is enti-
tled be determined? Who has the burden of proof and by what standard?
3. Who is going to make this determination? Will it be made in every
court or only once? What avenues are available to streamline this pro-
cedure to reduce victim expense and conserve judicial resources?
66. Amy is referred to as "Misty" in Brunner because she is the victim in the "Misty" child
pornography series. See United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 783 n.1 (E.D. Tex. 2009).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See id. at *4.
70. See United States v. Hicks, No. 1:09-CR-150, 2009 WL 4110260, at *5 (E.D. Va. Nov.
24, 2009).
71. Id.
72. Id. at *6.
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4. Is each defendant liable for payment of the full amount of restitution or
may the court apportion liability among defendants to reflect the level
of contribution to the victim's loss and/or economic circumstances of
each defendant?
5. Is there any proximate cause requirement between the victim's losses
and the particular defendant's conduct?
6. How should restitution orders and payments be managed when multiple
defendants in multiple judicial districts are responsible for restitution to
the same victim, or to multiple victims? How is the potential for double
recovery to be avoided and what safeguards are available?7 3
These questions reflect two primary concerns. First, the court was con-
cerned with the large number of potential claimants and defendants, and
with the logistical complexities that would result from handling all of these
claims.74 These concerns are pragmatic in that they seek to address the prac-
ticability of hearing and administering restitution requests and
administrative in nature. Second, the court was concerned with the causal
link between the victim's harm and the defendant's offense, and the diffi-
culty of finding a causal link between the victim's harm and the defendant's
offense that could support awarding a particular monetary amount for the
asserted harm.7 ' This concern is theoretical because it involves an examina-
tion of the nature of the offense, as well as what the law means by "victim,"
"harm," and "cause."
Parts II and III argue that district courts should use two approaches to
proximate causation doctrine to analyze the legal issues stemming from Sec-
tion 2259 restitution claims and to place appropriate limitations on the
application of Section 2259 to child pornography possession defendants.
11. THE PALSGRAF FRAMEWORK: PLACING LIMITS ON THE
APPLICATION OF SECTION 2259 THROUGH THE USE OF
CLASSIC PROXIMATE CAUSATION DOCTRINE
Traditional proximate causation analysis provides limiting principles
for the application of Section 2259 to child pornography possession
73. Order at 3-4, United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 6:08-
CR-61).
74. These concerns are expressed especially in questions 3, 4, and 6.
75. This concern is expressed especially in questions 1, 2, and 5.
76. It is difficult to precisely define "proximate cause:' but Prosser and Keeton provide a
helpful explanation of the concept:
"Proximate cause"-in itself an unfortunate term-is merely the limitation which the courts
have placed upon the actor's responsibility for the consequences of the actor's conduct. In a
philosophical sense, the consequences of an act go forward to eternity, and the causes of an
event go back to the dawn of human events, and beyond. But any attempt to impose responsi-
bility upon such a basis would result in infinite liability for all wrongful acts, and would "set
society on edge and fill the courts with endless litigation." As a practical matter, legal respon-
sibility must be limited to those causes which are so closely connected with the result and of
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defendants. Although Section 2259 restitution claims take place in a crimi-
nal context, they are more closely related to civil tort proceedings:
Viewed in one light [a criminal restitution statute] is a criminal statute-it
is a part of criminal sentencing and is published in the criminal code. But
in another light, [a criminal restitution statute] is civil-in compensating
victims for their specific losses, it resembles an attenuated tort proceeding
held during a pause in a criminal proceeding.7
For purposes of this Note, the more relevant view of a criminal
restitution hearing is its resemblance to a civil tort proceeding. The similar
causal requirements are particularly noteworthy. One court observed that "a
number of courts have determined that Section 2259 contains something
akin to a tort-like proximate cause requirement.""
The classic exposition of proximate causation doctrine is framed in the
famous case, Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad.9 In the Palsgraf opinion,
Judges Cardozo and Andrews articulated two competing views of proximate
causation.W Cardozo argued that proximate causation reflects the relation-
ship between the tortfeasor and the victim; that is, certain relationships
create duties to specific people." Andrews posited that proximate cause was
82
not so limited. He argued that one's duty of care is to the entire world, and
thus proximate causation is a line-drawing exercise that is ultimately de-
cided by public policy considerations. This Part uses the Andrews view to
examine the application of Section 2259 liability to child pornography pos-
session defendants.
such significance that the law is justified in imposing liability. Some boundary must be set to
liability for the consequences of any act, upon the basis of some social idea of justice or policy.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 264 (5th ed. 1984)
(citations omitted).
77. Spohn, supra note 17, at 1016-17.
78. United States v. Hicks, No. 1:09-CR-150, 2009 WL 4110260, at *4 (E.D. Va. Nov. 24,
2009) (citing United States v. Doe, 488 F.3d 1154, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 2007), United States v. Julian,
242 F.3d 1245, 1247-48 (10th Cir. 2001);,United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 965 (9th Cir. 1999),
and United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 125-26 (3d Cir. 1999)).
79. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). The facts of Paisgraf were as follows: A man carrying a pack-
age was running to catch a train. As he jumped onto the train, he seemed unsteady, and two railroad
employees helped push him onto the train. While the employees were pushing the man onto the
train, the package dislodged and fell to the rails. Although the package seemed innocuous, it in fact
contained fireworks. The fireworks exploded when they hit the rails, causing scales "many feet
away" at the other end of the platform to fall. The plaintiff, Ms. Palsgraf, was injured by these fal-
ling scales and sued the railroad for negligence. Id.
80. See Palsgraf, 162 N.E. 99; id. at 101-105 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 100 (majority opinion).
82. Id. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 103-04.
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A. Judge Andrews's Dissent: Proximate Causation
as an Expression of Policy Concerns
Judge Andrews's interpretation of the function of proximate causation
has been embraced by modem courts. The Supreme Court, generally, and
the Ninth Circuit, in a seminal case on Section 2259, have used the Andrews
framework to place appropriate limitations on the scope of tort liability. An-
drews's view of proximate causation emphasized that, as a policy matter,
courts must limit liability.4 Often, the point at which a court draws the
bounds of liability will be arbitrary. The potentially dramatic expansion of
liability that would attend Section 2259 claims against possession defen-
dants suggests that an Andrews-style proximate causation analysis should
not generate liability for defendants convicted only of child pornography
possession.
The position taken by Judge Andrews presents a view of proximate cau-
sation that uses public policy to limit the legal relationship between a
wrongdoer and a victim. Andrews's dissent famously asserted that all indi-
viduals owe a duty of care to "the world at large."" Andrews rejected the
contention that due care is a specific duty that applies only between particu-
lar individuals." His view maintains that proximate causation is simply a
line-drawing exercise that, ultimately, must be grounded in policy con-
87
cerns.
Though Cardozo's opinion has become the conventional view of proxi-
mate causation," Andrews's approach to proximate causation has gained
considerable traction in recent years.8 The Supreme Court has expressed a
view of proximate cause consistent with Andrews's policy-centric position,
holding that proximate cause doctrine is fundamentally a line-drawing proc-
ess and underscoring the importance of pragmatic considerations in
evaluating causal connections. 0 The Court noted that "[h]ere we use 'prox-
imate cause' to label generically the judicial tools used to limit a person's
responsibility for the consequences of that person's own acts. At bottom, the
84. See id. at 102-04.
85. Id. at 103.
86. See id. at 102 ("Due care is a duty imposed on each one of us to protect society from
unnecessary danger, not to protect A, B, or C alone.").
87. See id. at 103-04.
88. See Joseph W. Little, Palsgraf Revisited (Again), 6 PIERCE L. REv. 75, 81 (2007) ("Car-
dozo's conception of duty swept through the common law world and has yet to be supplanted by the
courts." (footnote omitted)).
89. See id. at 84-86 (arguing that the Restatement (Third) of Torts has adopted Andrews's
view of duty). In addition, the Supreme Courts of Wisconsin and New Mexico purport to follow the
Andrews doctrine. See id. at 82; Lisa M. Nuttall, Note, TORT LAW-Foreseeability vs. Public Policy
Considerations in Determining the Duty of Physicians to Non-Patients-Lester v. Hall, 30 N.M. L.
REv. 351, 354-55 (2000). Decisions of the California Supreme Court indicate it has adopted the
Andrews view of proximate causation. See Robin Meadow & Jennifer L. King, Proximate Cause: A
Question of Fact or Policy?, ABTL REP., Feb. 2000, at 5, 5.
90. See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992) (quoting W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., supra note 76, § 41).
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notion of proximate cause reflects 'ideas of what justice demands, or of
what is administratively possible and convenient.' "9' This view of proximate
cause as a judicial tool essentially adopts Andrews's position on proximate
cause.
The current appellate case law on Section 2259, though limited, also
tracks the Andrews-style approach to proximate causation. The Ninth Cir-
cuit's opinion in United States v. Laney is one of the few federal appellate
decisions that grapples with Section 2259 as applied to a defendant who did
not directly abuse the victim seeking restitution." The Laney opinion dem-
onstrates the court's attempt to establish parameters around a nebulous
harm. In Laney, the defendant and several other men met in an internet chat
room to discuss and share child pornography.9 Laney made a sexually ex-
plicit videotape of himself abusing two minor girls ("Jane Does Two and
Three") and shared the videotape with a man from the chat room. 94Laney
also advised another man on how to molest a certain child ("Jane Doe
One").5 The district court ordered Laney to pay restitution to Jane Doe
One.6
The Ninth Circuit upheld the restitution order and held the defendant li-
able even though he did not directly abuse the compensated victim.9 Yet the
court's opinion did not clearly explain where liability begins and ends.
Though the Ninth Circuit was explicit in holding that Section 2259 "incor-
porates a requirement of proximate causation,"" the court did not spell out
how this requirement might work in practice. However, the reasoning be-
hind the opinion suggests that the Ninth Circuit employed proximate cause
as a judicial tool for cutting off liability at a certain point, simply because
infinite liability is not a practical principle for courts to apply.9
The Laney court's affirmation of the restitution order exemplifies pre-
cisely the sort of line-drawing exercise that Judge Andrews viewed as the
core function of proximate causation doctrine. The court held the defendant
liable for restitution, despite the lack of direct abuse, because the defendant
pled guilty to participating in a conspiracy to sexually exploit children.'0o
The court suggested that, but for the application of the Pinkerton Doctrine,'o'
91. Id.
92. 189 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1999).
93. Laney, 189 F.3d at 957-58.
94. Id. at 957.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 958.
97. Id. at 966.
98. Id. at 965.
99. See id. at 964-66.
100. Id. at 966.
101. See i at 965 (citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (imposing vicari-
ous liability on a defendant for reasonably foreseeable crimes committed by a coconspirator in
furtherance of the conspiracy)).
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there would have been no causal connection between Laney's offense and
the victim's harm: "Section 2259 therefore requires a causal connection be-
tween the offense of conviction and the victim's harm. When the offense of
conviction is conspiracy, however, the harms the offense caused may include
not only those resulting from the defendant's individual actions, but also
others caused by the conspiracy itself."10 Thus the Ninth Circuit concluded
that a defendant who did not directly abuse the victim could be liable under
Section 2259 if he were also convicted of conspiracy. The court implied,
however, that a defendant with neither a conspiracy conviction nor a charge
of direct abuse would not be liable.
Judge Eginton's comments during the restitution hearing in United
States v. Hesketh bolster the Ninth Circuit's position on the limitations on
the application of Section 2259. During the hearing, Judge Eginton noted
that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Section 2259 in Laney would likely
foreclose restitution against end users of child pornography: "[Als the gov-
ernment points out, the strongest argument that Section 2259 does not really
impose mandatory restitution against the end users, is based upon interpret-
ing the section to require a causal connection strict enough to foreclose
restitution against an end user, and in Laney that's what happened.,,03
The facts of the Laney case are not exactly analogous to the typical child
pornography possession case, 4 where the defendant is generally not in-
volved at all in the direct abuse of a victim.'os The harm done to Jane Doe
One by defendant Laney certainly seems much closer to direct abuse than a
pure possession case. Nevertheless, Laney was ordered to pay restitution to
a victim whom he had not directly abused. To extend the Laney facts, we
can imagine a scenario in which Laney did not have any contact with the
other men in the chat room concerning Jane Doe One, but did possess im-
ages of Jane Doe One's abuse (this would make Laney a very close analogue
to a typical child pornography defendant). If Laney were convicted of con-
spiracy-if he, for example, had contact with the other men concerning
other victims, but had no contact concerning Jane Doe One-then, pre-
sumably, Laney would be liable to Jane Doe One under the Pinkerton
Doctrine. However, if Laney were never involved in the chat room activity
but possessed the same images of Jane Doe One, it seems likely that the
Ninth Circuit would not hold Laney liable. Yet, in both scenarios, Laney's
acts had an equal effect on Jane Doe One-in both cases, he possessed
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. Transcript of Hesketh Restitution Hearing, supra note 4, at 24.
104. See Laney, 189 F.3d at 957-58. The defendant in Laney acted wrongfully beyond merely
possessing images of Jane Doe One. Laney provided "suggestions" to the abuser of Jane Doe One
about how "best" to teach a child to perform certain sex acts. These acts were videotaped as part of
an "on-line molestation" of Jane Doe One, and the videotapes were later sent to the defendant. The
defendant did not directly participate in the online molestation.
105. See JANIS WOLAK ET AL., CHILD-PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSORs ARRESTED IN INTERNET-
RELATED CRIMES: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL JUVENILE ONLINE VICTIMIZATION STUDY 17
(2005) (finding that in 84 percent of child pornography possession cases "investigators did not de-
tect concurrent child sexual victimization or attempts at child victimization").
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images of her abuse.'0 This outcome suggests that the Ninth Circuit implic-
itly engaged in the type of policy exercise that Andrews envisioned as the
function of proximate cause. A defendant who possesses illicit images and
who is convicted of conspiracy will be liable for restitution pursuant to Sec-
tion 2259. But where a defendant possesses these images and is not
convicted of conspiracy, the law "declines to trace [the] series of events be-
yond a certain point."
B. Why Exclude Child Pornography Possession Defendants
from Section 2259 Liability?
Holding possession defendants liable under the statute presents serious
policy concerns. The number of potential victims and defendants is stagger-
ing, and the possibility of inconsistent applications of the statute is already
apparent. 08 In Amy's case alone, there are approximately 800 defendants
across the country charged with possessing child pornography that includes
her images.'" Many child pornography possession defendants collect hun-
dreds or thousands of images of child pornography.no Each year, there are
approximately 2,000 identified victims of child pornography and 3,000 fed-
eral child pornography prosecutions."' The difficulties administering a fair
and consistent process for adjudicating restitution claims are obvious and
substantial.12
Andrews's public policy view of proximate cause is a sensible approach
to limiting the application of Section 2259 to child pornography possession
defendants. Andrews recognized that a wrongdoer could cause harm without
being the legal cause of harm to that victim: "Take our rule as to fires.
Sparks from my burning haystack set on fire my house and my neighbor's. I
may recover from a negligent railroad. He may not. Yet the wrongful act as
106. Presumably some form of collaboration would be necessary for a conspiracy conviction,
and, arguably, such collaboration (like participating in an internet child pornography chat room)
encourages child molestation and child pornography in a way that could make the entire community
of conspirators more dangerous to victims. However, we can imagine a situation that could warrant
a conspiracy conviction where the participation in the conspiracy was so minimal as to cause essen-
tially the same harm to a victim in the possessed images as a child pornography possessor who did
not participate in a conspiracy. Take, for example, a "conspiracy" defendant who registers for a child
pornography website and visits the website once a month to download child pornography, but who
is only one of thousands of members downloading the material, and who never contacts any other
members of the website.
107. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
108. See supra Sections I.B and I.C.
109. Knaupp, supra note 6.
110. WOLAK ET AL., supra note 105, at 7 ("Of those arrested for CP [child pornography]
possession, law enforcement found about half (48%) had more than 100 graphic still images, and
14% had 1,000 or more graphic images.").
111. Knaupp, supra note 6.
112. See supra Section I.C.
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directly harmed the one as the other.""' Andrews's acknowledgement re-
flects the reality that many wrongful acts have harmful effects that touch the
lives of many peoplell 4 and that eventually courts "reach the point where
they cannot say the stream comes from any one source."
The Supreme Court's opinion in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protec-
tion Corp. lends further support to drawing the line at child pornography
possession defendants. The Holmes court, using Andrews-style analysis,
focused on the exact concerns that have troubled lower courts in applying
Section 2259 to child pornography possessors-namely, that the attenuation
of the causal relationship leads to serious difficulties administering restitu-
tion claims. The court noted three problems that such claims pose: (1) "the
less direct an injury is, the more difficult it becomes to ascertain the amount
of a plaintiff's damages attributable to the violation, as distinct from other,
independent, factors"; (2) "recognizing claims of the indirectly injured
would force courts to adopt complicated rules apportioning damages among
plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from the violative acts, to ob-
viate the risk of multiple recoveries"; and (3) "the need to grapple with these
problems is simply unjustified by the general interest in deterring injurious
conduct, since directly injured victims can generally be counted on to vindi-
cate the law as private attorneys general, without any of the problems
attendant upon suits by plaintiffs injured more remotely."' '7
The same concerns apply to the imposition of Section 2259 liability to
child pornography possession defendants. Amy's case is a helpful example.
First, it is difficult to ascertain how to attribute responsibility for her injury
among the 800 defendants who possessed her images. Second, the unfet-
tered application of Section 2259 to multiple defendants would force the
courts to adopt "complicated rules" to divide damages among claimants and
defendants. Third, if Amy has been directly injured, there is no need for her
to pursue a difficult-to-administer civil claim that attaches to a criminal sen-
tencing process; she can simply use the tort system to vindicate her rights.
The Supreme Court's analysis leads to the conclusion that the policy con-
siderations arising from such claims can sever the causal chain between
victim and defendant.
113. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 103-04 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
114. See id. at 104 ("We said the act of the railroad was not the proximate cause of our neigh-
bor's fire. Cause it surely was. The words we used were simply indicative of our notions of public
policy.").
115. Id.
116. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992). Holmes is a securities
case in which the respondent nonprofit corporation argued that it had standing to assert RICO claims
on behalf of its member broker-dealers. The Supreme Court interpreted the relevant statute as re-
quiring proximate cause and concluded that the appellants had not proximately caused the
respondent's "injury" pursuant to the statute at issue. Id. at 261-72.
117. Id. at 269-70. Though Holmes deals with indirect harms, and Section 2259 claims pur-
port to deal with direct harms, the concerns voiced here seem equally relevant to the causal issues
presented by Section 2259 claims.
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In addition, the use of policy to sever liability at child pornography pos-
session defendants aligns with an economic view of tort causation. In a 1965
Harvard Law Review article,"' Professor Guido Calabresi advanced an in-
fluential economic view of tort causation, eloquently summarized here by
Francesco Parisi and Vincy Fon:
Calabresi notes that, as the current tort system apportions liability based on
fault, it only deters those accidents that are caused through fault and ig-
nores the value of deterring accidents that are faultless. Calabresi suggests
this could be cured by adopting a system of nonfault liability that assesses
the costs of accidents in activities according to the involvement in the ac-
tivity, irrespective of legal notions of fault. Calabresi further suggests that
in part this may be addressed by dividing the costs of an accident pro rata
among the sub-activities involved. For example, if a walker, a bicyclist,
and an automobile are all involved in an accident, the costs would be di-
vided among these three sub-activities. If this occurred in case after case,
the cumulative effect would be to assign greater liability to those activities
that are involved in more accidents (both numerically and in terms of ex-
pense)."9
If courts allow Section 2259 claims against child pornography posses-
sion defendants, the assignment of liability will eventually skew
disproportionately toward end consumers. For example, Amy's uncle, her
original abuser, paid only $6,000 in restitution.12 0 Yet, in the first year alone,
Amy received $170,000 in restitution from child pornography possession
defendants.121 She now seeks a total of $3.4 million from those who possess
her images.122 No matter how generously one "slices the pie" of fault, one
cannot imagine that the amount paid by the original abuser is a proportional
representation of his contribution to the harm. This suggests that Section
2259 claims will actually underdeter those who cause the greatest harms. It
makes sense, then, to correct this disproportionate assignment of liability by
severing the chain of causal liability at child pornography possession defen-
dants.
III. SPECIFIC DUTIES: THE CARDOZo FRAMEWORK
The competing approach to proximate causation analysis, Cardozo's re-
lational duty framework, would likely also limit the restitutionary liability of
child pornography possession defendants under Section 2259. The relational
duty framework, unlike Andrews's "duty-to-all" approach, requires a rela-
118. Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of
Costs, 78 HARv. L. REv. 713, 719-20 (1965).
119. Francesco Parisi & Vincy Fon, Causation and Responsibility: The Compensation Princi-
ple from Grotius to Calabresi, 64 MD. L. REV. 108, 108-09 (2005) (citations omitted).
120. Tim McGlone, Victim of child porn seeks damages from viewers, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Oct.
25, 2009, at A6.
121. Schwartz, supra note 15.
122. Id.
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tionship between the specific victim and the defendant that supports a legal
duty of care. Section III.A outlines Judge Cardozo's conceptions of duty and
proximate causation. Section II.B analyzes why society has criminalized
child pornography possession and whether its criminalization is meant to
protect society as a whole, or only particular individuals. Finally, Section
III.C examines the legal treatment of the republication of defamatory state-
ments and discusses the possibility of an analogous framework for Section
2259 claims.
A. Relational Duties
Judge Cardozo, writing for the majority in Palsgraf, presented an alter-
native to Judge Andrews's "duty-to-all" approach to proximate causation.
Cardozo argued that tort liability to another person is grounded in a specific
duty to that person or class of persons.123 He wrote, "What the plaintiff must
show is 'a wrong' to herself, i.e., a violation of her own right, and not mere-
ly a wrong to some one else, nor conduct 'wrongful' because unsocial, but
not 'a wrong' to any one." 24 How does a plaintiff demonstrate a violation of
"her own right"? Cardozo argued that this relational aspect is satisfied if the
tortious act creates a particular risk, and if the harm that actually occurs re-
alizes that particular risk. 12 This is another way of saying that legal
causation is fact-driven. Cardozo famously asserted that there is no "negli-
gence in the air,"26 meaning that negligence is necessarily contextual and
correlative to the risk posed by the circumstances.12 The nature of the risk
posed to the victim must be proved by its foreseeability.128 In sum, to meet
Cardozo's standard for legal causation, the plaintiff must prove that the de-
fendant owed a duty to her (or a class of persons like her). The plaintiff must
prove the existence of this duty by showing that the risk the defendant took
in his negligent act was the same risk that was realized by the actual harm,
and that this harm would foreseeably hurt the plaintiff or a class of persons
like the plaintiff.
In his Palsgraf opinion, Cardozo intended to comment only on duty, not
on causation. He specifically attempted to exclude causation from the thrust
of the opinion, writing that "[t]he law of causation, remote or proximate, is
123. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y 1928).
124. Id. at 100.
125. Id.; accord Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wmngdoing, 63 CHI-KENT L. REv. 407,
440 (1987) ("A negligent act releases a set of possibilities that due care could have avoided. Cardozo
insists that the plaintiff cannot recover unless the injury that occurs actualizes a possibility within
this set.").
126. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99 (quoting FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTs 345 (15th
ed. 1951)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. Id. at 100. Cardozo gives the example of a car recklessly speeding on a crowded city
street. He observes that the same act "on a speedway or a race course" would "lose its wrongful
quality." Id.
128. Id.
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thus foreign to the case before us." 29 However, duty and proximate cause are
closely related."o Duty relates to the foreseeability that the plaintiff, or
someone like the plaintiff, would be harmed by the conduct; proximate
cause, on the other hand, relates to the foreseeability that the injury realized
in the plaintiff's harm was the same sort of injury risked by the defendant's
conduct. However, the two concepts are used "somewhat interchangeably"
by the courts.
Cardozo's conception of duty has formed the groundwork for the mod-
em conception of proximate cause as relational and determined on the basis
of an actor's ability to anticipate certain consequences of his actions.132 The
next Section will explain how courts might apply Cardozo's proximate
cause framework to limit Section 2259 restitution liability, before exploring
the nature of the risks associated with child pornography possession and
why society considers this conduct wrongful.
B. Is Child Pornography Possession an Individual or Societal Harm?
Is child pornography possession primarily wrongful because of its threat
to societal interests? Or is it wrongful because it harms particular people?
Determining whether child pornography possession is criminalized primar-
ily as a result of individual or societal interests will shed light on the causal
link between the possession of illicit images and the harm to children de-
picted in those images.
Cardozo emphasizes that certain behavior may be "wrongful and unso-
cial," but if it is not wrongful or unsocial "in relation to" a particular person,
then the behavior is not tortious. '3 This remark expresses a fundamental
distinction between tort law and criminal law: tortious actions must be di-
rected toward a particular person, while some criminal actions may be
wrongful only to society in its entirety.'34 Child pornography possession is
criminal, but this says nothing about whether the criminalization of this act
is designed to counter individual or societal threats.
The crime of possession in general (e.g., possession of drugs, weapons,
stolen property, etc.) has been described as "victimless."'3 Professor Dubber
129. Id. at 101.
130. See Weinrib, supra note 125, at 441.
131. Kenneth Vinson, Disentangling Law and Fact: Echoes of Proximate Cause in the Work-
ers' Compensation Coverage Formula, 47 ALA. L. REV. 723, 753 (1996) (citing Pease v. Sinclair
Ref. Co., 104 F.2d 183, 185 (2d Cir. 1939), for the proposition that "most cases in which the issue of
proximate cause predominates might just as easily be decided under the duty issue or vice versa").
132. See Little, supra note 88, at 81.
133. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100 (emphasis added).
134. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Crimi-
nal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 852 (2001) ("[Cjriminal law does not concern itself
with interpersonal crimes, and so it neither punishes nor protects human beings, but instead protects
social interests against whatever threat they may face.").
135. Id. at 833. Some commonly cited examples of crimes against society (so-called "victim-
less" crimes) are gambling, prostitution, and drug possession. See Arielle Goldhammer, A Case
Section 2259 Restitution Claims
argues that the crime of possession is emblematic of a new criminal law
regime---one that protects societal, not individual interests:
[O]ur comprehensive effort to control the dangerous by any means neces-
sary reaches "possessors" along with "distributors," "manufacturers,"
"importers," and other transgressors caught in an ever wider and ever finer
web of state norms designed for one purpose: to police human threats.
Policing human threats is different from punishing persons. A police re-
gime doesn't punish. It seeks to eliminate threats if possible, and to
minimize them if necessary.
... Crimes, as serious violations of another's rights, are of incidental sig-
nificance to a system of threat control. .. . Law, as a state run system of
interpersonal conflict resolution, is . . . irrelevant. Persons matter neither as
the source, nor as the target, of threats. Penal police is a matter between the
state and threats.'36
Professor Dubber's argument does not focus on child pornography posses-
sion.' Is it appropriate to group child pornography possession with other
crimes of possession, like drug or gun possession, which seem to respond to
general societal threats? If so, then child pornography possessors may not
have the sort of legally recognized causal relationship with the children in the
images that would justify civil-type liability-though such possessors will
certainly be criminally liable. If not, then child pornography possessors may
owe a duty to specific victims, which could support civil-type liability., 8
Congress and the courts have provided mixed answers when addressing
whether the offense of child pornography possession is designed to protect
society or individuals. The legislative history concerning the criminalization
of child pornography suggests that Congress was responding both to a sys-
temic problem and to individualized harm to victims. Congressional
findings state that "the use of children as subjects of pornographic materials
is harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the individ-
ual child and to society."'3 9 Congress did specifically identify individual
harm to victims as a reason for passing § 2252 (the statute criminalizing the
distribution, transport, possession, and sale of child pornography),"4 0 finding:
(1) the use of children in the production of sexually explicit material, in-
cluding photographs, films, videos, computer images, and other visual
Against Consensual Crimes: Why the Law Should Stay out of Pocketbooks, Bedrooms, and Medicine
Cabinets, 41 BRANDEIs L.J. 237, 240 (2002).
136. Dubber, supra note 134, at 833-34.
137. Dubber briefly references "obscene material" and "obscene sexual performances by a
child" in a list of possession offenses, but focuses primarily on drug and gun possession. See id. at
857.
138. This liability would perhaps be subject to the constraints of the policy-based analysis
discussed in Section II.A.
139. Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, § 2(3), 98 Stat. 204 (emphasis added).
140. Child Protection Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2006).
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depictions, is a form of sexual abuse which can result in physical or
psychological harm, or both, to the children involved;
(2) where children are used in its production, child pornography perma-
nently records the victim's abuse, and its continued existence causes the
child victims of sexual abuse continuing harm by haunting those chil-
dren in future years ....
However, Congress also cited numerous broad threats to societal interests
as rationales for the statute.14 2 Congress found that child pornography is used
to seduce other children into performing sexual acts; that it is used by pedo-
philes to "stimulate and whet their own sexual appetites"; that it
"desensitize[s] ... viewer[s] to the pathology of sexual abuse or exploitation
of children"; that it sexualizes children; that it has a "deleterious effect on all
children by encouraging a societal perception of children as sexual objects";
and that this sexualization "creates an unwholesome environment" in which to
raise children.143
In addition, because the jurisdictional hook for § 2252 is the Commerce
Clause,'" the congressional findings emphasized the interstate market in child
pornography 45 and the need to stem the demand for these images:
Prohibiting the intrastate production, transportation, distribution, receipt, ad-
vertising, and possession of child pornography, as well as the intrastate
transfer of custody of children for the production of child pornography, will
cause some persons engaged in such intrastate activities to cease all such ac-
tivities, thereby reducing both supply and demand in the interstate market
for child pornography.'"
While one of the consequences of a reduction in demand would be fewer
victims of child pornography, the justification for reducing demand is primar-
ily grounded in the broad societal interest in shrinking the overall market for
child pornography. 147 A reduction in demand for the illicit item is also a key
141. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §§ 121(l)-(2), 110
Stat. 3009, 3009-26 (emphasis added).
142. See id. § 121(3)-(4), (11).
143. Id. § 121(4), (11).
144. See Bradley Scott Shannon, The Jurisdictional Limits of Federal Criminal Child Pornog-
raphy Law, 21 U. HAw. L. REV. 73, 107 (1999) ("[E]ach of the crimes described in §§ 2252 and
2252A (other than those relating to the reproduction of child pornography) require that the child
pornography itself move in interstate or foreign commerce.").
145. See id. at 111-12 ("Congress enacted § 2252 based, in large part, upon its finding that
child pornography and child prostitution have become highly organized, multimillion dollar indus-
tries that operate on a nationwide scale, and that such prostitution and the sale and distribution of
such pornographic materials are carried on to a substantial extent through mails and other instru-
mentalities of interstate or foreign commerce." (quoting United States v. Robinson, 137 F.3d 652,
656 (1st Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
146. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2006) (emphasis added).
147. See United States v. Sherman, 268 F3d 539, 546 (7th Cir. 2001) ("The market maker
theory provides only an indirect link between a particular child used in the production of pornogra-
phy and a later purchaser or possessor of that material.... Although creating a market for the
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rationale for drug possession laws,148 which target societal harms, not individ-
ual harms.149
The courts have also given mixed answers on the question whether child
pornography offenses5 o target individual or societal harms."' The courts of
appeals are split on the question whether the primary victim of child pomog-
raphy is the depicted child or society as a whole.' The majority of the courts
of appeals have held that the depicted children are the primary victims of child
pornography.13 These courts, including the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits, were swayed by legislative history that indicated Con-
gress's concern with the severity of the harm to the individual depicted
child. 5 4 The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Rugh, emphasized that, in the
context of child pornography offenses, society is merely a "secondary" vic-
tim.' In United States v. Boos, the Ninth Circuit distinguished between so-
called "victimless" offenses, like drug and immigration offenses, and child
pornography offenses:
Moreover, quite unlike the drug and immigration offenses mentioned in the
Note-which are "victimless" crimes in the sense that the harm that they
materials certainly victimizes the children involved, we cannot say that the purchaser directly harms
the children involved.").
148. See A. Morgan Cloud, III, Cocaine, Demand, and Addiction: A Study of the Possible
Convergence of Rational Theory and National Policy, 42 VAND. L. REv. 725, 767 (1989).
149. See Dubber, supra note 134, at 833.
150. The offenses at issue range from transport to distribution to possession. Although this
Note focuses on possession, the reasoning behind the courts' decisions on other child pornography
offenses, which, like possession, involve indirect harms to the victims, are salient to this analysis.
151. Courts have addressed this question in the context of sentencing. The Sentencing Guide-
lines allow the "grouping" of multiple counts if the counts involve the same primary victim.
"Therefore, when determining if multiple-count convictions of related offenses should be grouped
for sentencing purposes, courts must first identify the primary victim of the particular crime. If the
court cannot identify clearly the primary victim of the multiple counts, the primary victim is deemed
to be society in general." Elias Manos, Casenote, Who Are the Real Victims of Child Pornography?
After United States v. Sherman, the Answer Is Becoming Clear, 10 VILL. SPoRTs & ENT. L.J. 327,
327-28 (2003); accord U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3D1.2 (2010).
152. See Sherman, 268 F.3d at 547-48 (holding that the depicted child is the primary victim
of the possession, receipt, and distribution of child pornography); United States v. Tillmon, 195 F.3d
640, 645 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that the depicted child is the primary victim of the transport of
child pornography); United States v. Norris, 159 F.3d 926, 930-34 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that the
depicted child is the primary victim of the receipt of child pornography); United States v. Hibbler,
159 F.3d 233, 237 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that the depicted child is the primary victim of the pos-
session and distribution of child pornography); United States v. Boos, 127 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding that the depicted child is the primary victim of the distribution of child pornogra-
phy); United States v. Ketcham, 80 F.3d 789, 793 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that the depicted child is
the primary victim of the receipt, transport, distribution, and recording of child pornography); Unit-
ed States v. Rugh, 968 F.2d 750, 756 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that the depicted child is the primary
victim of the receipt of child pornography). But see United States v. Toler, 901 F2d 399, 403 (4th
Cir. 1990) (holding that society in general is the primary victim of the transport of child pornogra-
phy).
153. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
154. See Tillmon, 195 F.3d at 643; Norris, 159 F.3d at 930; Hibbler, 159 F.3d at 237; Boos,
127 F.3d at 1213; Ketcham, 80 F.3d at 793; Rugh, 968 F.2d at 755.
155. Rugh, 968 F.2d at 755. The Seventh Circuit also noted that society is a victim of child
pornography offenses but is not the primary victim. See Sherman, 268 F.3d at 547.
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produce is spread evenly throughout society-the harm caused by the dis-
tribution of child pornography is concentrated. It is visited upon a single
individual or discrete group of individuals, namely, the child or children
116
used in the production of the pornographic material.
The most recent opinion on this issue, issued by the Seventh Circuit in
United States v. Sherman, concurred with the majority of the courts of ap-
peals.'17 The Sherman court, following the rationale of the U.S. Supreme
Court in New York v. Ferber,"' explained that the violation of the depicted
child's privacy, along with the perpetual nature of the harm, suffices to make
the depicted child the primary victim: "The possession, receipt and shipping
of child pornography directly victimizes the children portrayed by violating
their right to privacy, and in particular violating their individual interest in
avoiding the disclosure of personal matters.""9 In total, seven of the eight
circuits to decide the issue have concluded that individual children are the
primary victims of child pornography offenses.
The Fourth Circuit found that the primary victim of child pornography is
society generally.'6 In United States v. Toler, the Fourth Circuit interpreted
the congressional findings as manifesting an intent to protect a broad socie-
tal interest in community morality: "An examination of this statute and its
legislative history demonstrates that its primary focus . . . is the harm to the
moral fabric of society at large.""' The court noted that the Senate Report
evinced a concern with a "continuing cycle of child abuse" in which chil-
dren who are molested later become child molesters themselves.162 For the
Fourth Circuit, this cycle of abuse represented a systemic, rather than an
individualized, harm.
Judge Posner, vigorously dissenting in Sherman, agreed with the Fourth
Circuit that the primary victim of child pornography is society in its entirety.
Judge Posner made two main arguments. First, Posner asserted that merely
because the depicted children are identifiable does not render them primary
156. Boos, 127 F.3d at 1210. The "Note" to which the court refers is Application Note 2 to
§ 3D1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines, which explains the term "victim":
The term "victim" is not intended to include indirect or secondary victims. Generally, there
will be one person who is directly and most seriously affected by the offense and is therefore
identifiable as the victim. For offenses in which there are no identifiable victims (e.g., drug or
immigration offenses, where society at large is the victim), the "victim" for purposes of sub-
sections (a) and (b) [of 3D1.2] is the societal interest that is harmed.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3D1.2 cmt.2 (2010).
157. 268 F.3d 539 (7th Cir. 2001).
158. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
159. Sherman, 268 F.3d at 547 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759 n.10).
160. See United States v. Toler, 901 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1990); Sherman, 268 E3d at 547 (Pos-
ner, J., dissenting).
161. Toler, 901 F.2d at 403.
162. Id. at 403 n.5 (citing S. REP. No. 95-438, at 5-9 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
40, 43-46).
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victims.1 He argued that child pornography offenses are more like drug or
immigration offenses'6 (harms primarily to society but with secondary vic-
tims) than murder or robbery (harms to clearly identifiable primary
victims).'6 Posner observed that the drug trade also creates indirect victims,
but that Congress's intent in criminalizing drugs was to protect societal in-
terests, not the interests of these indirect victims:
[T]he children used in the pornography are merely the secondary victims,
much like many of the people employed in the drug trade-the "mules"
who die when the bags of cocaine that they've swallowed burst, the wives
and girlfriends who are roped into assisting their husbands or boyfriends in
the drug trade, the drug dealers killed in gang wars, and the addicts who
turn to selling drugs to support their habit. Nominally, most of these are
"consenting adults," but, realistically, many are coerced or inveigled into
criminal participation. Yet the principal concern behind the criminalization
of drug dealing is not with any of these unfortunates; it is with the con-
sumption of the drugs and with the entire range of consequences thought to
flow from that consumption.
Second, Posner observed that the Child Pornography Prevention Act
amended the definition of "child pornography" to include computer-
simulated images of child pornography or images of adults made to look
like children.' Yet the punishment for defendants convicted of child por-
nography offenses involving real children is no greater than the punishment
for defendants convicted of child pornography offenses involving simulated
children or adults. Posner pointed out that the Senate Report cited by the
government states that "computer-generated child pornography poses the
same threat to the well-being of children as photographic child pornogra-
phy."69 Indeed, Posner argued:
This statement would be nonsense if the government's brief were correct in
saying that "the victims" of child pornography are the children used in the
making of it.... From the parity of concern that the statute and the legisla-
tive history express with respect to simulated and actual pornography we
can infer that the primary victim is not the child used in the pornography
163. Sherman, 268 F.3d at 551 (Posner, J., dissenting).
164. Posner notes that drug and immigration offenses are viewed as "paradigmatic" of
"groupable" offenses (i.e., those offenses primarily affecting society at large). Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. Posner noted that the same holds true for immigration offenses:
similarly, many illegal immigrants are abused, sometimes even enslaved, by employers or by
the traffickers in illegal immigrants, but the chief concern behind the restrictions on immigra-
tion is not with those unfortunates but with the effect of unrestricted immigration on citizen
employment, on crime, and on welfare and other government programs.
Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 552 (citing S. REP. No. 104-358, at 15 (1996)).
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but the child seduced or molested by a pedophile stimulated by such por-
nography.o70
Judge Posner found that the legislative history clearly indicates that "the
principal concern behind criminalizing child pornography is the fear that it
incites child molestation." 7 1
Neither Congress nor the courts have provided a resoundingly clear an-
swer to the question, who is the primary victim of child pornography
possession? Congressional findings indicate that Congress had multiple
concerns, but it is unclear which concern was foremost. The majority of the
courts of appeals have concluded that the depicted children are the primary
victims, but the Fourth Circuit and Judge Posner present a compelling ar-
gument that society is the primary victim of child pornography. This novel
and complex legal issue leaves us in murky water. To provide a framework
for this unresolved question, this Note turns to a useful analogy: the legal
treatment of the republication of defamatory statements.
C. Defamation Law: A Helpful Analogy
Defamation law provides a useful analogue. The republication of de-
famatory statements follows the single-publication rule, which holds
producers and distributors liable to the defamed person for damages. How-
ever, readers of the defamatory statements are not themselves liable. This
legal treatment demonstrates that, when dealing with a network of people
who pass along material that is harmful to an individual, the law does not
see the end consumer as himself harming the individual by possessing the
material. Yet child pornography possession is criminalized. This distinc-
tion indicates that child pornography possession is not crininalized to
prevent harm to any one child, but is criminalized for what it tells us about
the possessor of the material-namely, that they are moral bad actors and
are potentially dangerous.
Defamation law is a subset of tort law that protects a person's interest in
her own reputation.'7 ' Defamation is the "act of harming the reputation of
another by making a false statement to a third person." 74 "Publication of
defamatory matter is its communication intentionally or by a negligent act to
one other than the person defamed."'"
170. Id.
171. Id. Judge Posner acknowledged another background motive for this statute: "[W]e should
be realistic and acknowledge that sheer disgust at people who have a sexual interest in prepubescent
children is a principal motivation for such legislation." Id.
172. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2252A (2006).
173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) ("A communication is defamatory if it
tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to
deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.").
174. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 479 (9th ed. 2009).
175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 (1977).
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The legal treatment of the republication of defamation has evolved over
time. Courts originally adhered to the multiple-publication rule, which states
that "each delivery of a libelous statement to a third party constitutes a new
publication of the libel, which in turn gives rise to a new cause of action."'7 6
However, the advent of mass publication made adherence to this rule im-
practicable for the courts: "[W]ith technological breakthroughs such as the
modem printing press, a single libelous statement could now reach millions
of readers and lead to a staggering number of lawsuits."'" These changing
circumstances led courts to develop the single-publication rule. This rule
states that "[a]ny one edition of a book or newspaper, or any one radio or
television broadcast, exhibition of a motion picture or similar aggregate
communication is a single publication."'79 So the publication of a defama-
tory statement in, for example, "a magazine with a large circulation would
count as a single publication and the libel victim would have only one cause
of action against the publisher."'80 However, if the defamatory statement
were republished, such that it reached a new audience, the libeled person
would have a new and separate cause of action against the publisher.'
In Firth v. State of New York, the leading case on internet publication of
defamation, the Court of Appeals of New York applied the single-
publication rule to website publication.182 The Firth court remarked that the
"policies impelling the original adoption of the single publication rule sup-
port its application" to communications over the internet.'83 Noting that
communications posted on the internet can be viewed by "thousands if not
millions ... for an indefinite period of time," the Firth court concluded that
the single-publication rule would ameliorate the "potential harassment [of
defendants] and excessive liability, and draining of judicial resources."'8
The publication chain of defamatory statements is analogous to the pro-
duction and distribution chain of child pornography. Both deal with wrongs
to particular, identifiable individuals. Both result in a perpetually reoccur-
ring harm."' Both involve a network of production, distribution, and
176. Sapna Kumar, Comment, Website Libel and the Single Publication Rule, 70 U. CmI. L.
REv. 639, 639 (2003) (emphasis added).
177. Id. Courts were also "concerned that the statute of limitations would no longer be effec-
tive if it were renewed every time a new party saw the libelous statement,' which would result in
publishers facing "countless lawsuits for an indefinite span of time." Id.
178. Id.
179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A (1977).
180. Kumar, supra note 176, at 642-43.
181. Id. at 643. Kumar gives the examples of a morning and afternoon edition of a newspaper
(two separate publications), and of a book released in hardback but then later rereleased in paper-
back (two separate publications). Id. at 645-46.
182. Firth v. State, 775 N.E.2d 464, 465 (N.Y. 2002).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 465-66.
185. See Richard J. Peltz, Fifteen Minutes of Infamy: Privileged Reporting and the Problem of
Perpetual Reputational Harm, 34 OHio N.U. L. REv. 717, 744 (2008) ("[C]ontent that is defamatory
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possession. Both have the potential for mass litigation. And in both cases,
the disseminated material is itself the direct cause of harm to the victim,
meaning that mere possession of the material (or, in the case of defamation,
the reading of the material) harms the depicted child or libeled person. The
Supreme Court has made this comparison explicit, noting that "[l]ike a de-
famatory statement, each new publication of the speech would cause new
injury to the child's reputation and emotional well-being."
Yet the single-publication rule does not hold the readers of defamatory
statements liable for damages to the defamed person. This aspect of the rule
is so apparent that it seems strange to single it out. It would be extremely
odd to hold a person who browsed through the National Enquirer liable for
damages to a celebrity for reading defamatory statements about that celeb-
rity. Yet the reader is precisely the link in the chain that corresponds to a
child pornography possessor. Why then is child pornography possession
criminalized, but not the possession or reading of defamatory material? Both
acts result in harm to the victim.' A person who reads defamatory material
harms the libeled person insofar as the reading of the material leads to a
reputational loss for that person. The key distinguishing feature seems to be
that society believes that possession of child pornography is morally con-
demnable in a way that possession of defamatory material is not. Possession
of child pornography says something about the possessor that deeply dis-
turbs most people-that the possessor is interested in viewing children
committing sexual acts and "may" be dangerous. This conclusion squares
with the arguments of both Professor Dubber and Judge Posner, who argue,
respectively, that crimes of possession are directed at general threats, and
that the child pornography possession statute is primarily concerned with
the incitation of child molestation.
It can be argued that defamation is unlike child pornography offenses in
that child pornography possession facilitates direct harm to other victims. 8
That is, child pornography possessors may be incited to molest children as a
result of viewing images of abuse."9 There are two compelling responses to
this point.'" First, it is not immediately obvious that reading defamatory
material does not incite readers to defame others. It is at least plausible that
defamatory statements could create a cycle of defamation among readers.
Second, although this is an empirical question that cannot be fully explored
... will retain the potential to injure anew at any time that it is downloaded-a perpetual reputa-
tional harm.").
186. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 249 (2002) (emphasis added).
187. There is a disanalogy here, in the sense that most people reading defamatory material
presumably do not realize that they are reading defamatory material. People who view child pornog-
raphy surely realize what they are viewing. However, it is not clear if this distinction makes an
analytical difference. Possession of child pornography is what is criminalized. This offense requires
no mens rea. See Dubber, supro note 134, at 859. Logically, neither wrong requires intent to cause
harm to the particular victim, though both wrongs do, arguably, cause such harm.
188. See United States v. Sherman, 268 F.3d 539, 552 (7th Cir. 2001) (Posner, J., dissenting).
189. Id.
190. Both responses raise empirical questions that are beyond the scope of this Note.
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here, at least some data suggest that viewing child pornography may not
incite actual abuse. One study indicates that in 84 percent of child pornogra-
phy possession cases, "investigators did not detect concurrent child sexual
victimization or attempts at child victimization."' 9' In addition, a 2009 Swiss
study, noting the dearth of studies that have "analyzed the association be-
tween child pornography consumption and the subsequent perpetration of
hands-on sex offenses,"' 92 concluded that "[t]he consumption of child por-
nography alone does not seem to represent a risk factor for committing
hands-on sex offenses in the present sample-at least not in those subjects
without prior convictions for hands-on sex offenses." 93 Finally, the Depart-
ment of Justice observed:
[I]n a majority (92 percent) of the child exploitation pornography offenses,
police were unable to link the offender with an identifiable victim. This
means that in most of the cases in which police were investigating an of-
fender for possession or distribution of child pornography, they were
unable to connect the offender to a crime against an actual child.
Thus, it may be that the fear of incitation is misplaced.
The analogy suggests that the chain of civil-type liability for Section
2259 claims should include producers ("publishers") and distributors ("re-
publishers") of child pornography, but should stop short of liability for the
end consumers ("readers") of child pornography. If, as this Note argues,
society targets child pornography possession because of a general desire to
condemn those whose sexual interests it considers dangerous, then liability
of the Iossessor to the depicted child is not "within the range of apprehen-
sion."'9 Therefore, a Cardozo-style analysis would suggest that the child
pornography possession defendant owed no foreseeable duty to the individ-
ual child.
IV. SOLUTIONS: How CHILD PORNOGRAPHY VICTIMS CAN PURSUE A
REMEDY IN CIVIL COURT
Given the harm suffered by child pornography victims, it is important
that the judicial system provide some remedy to these victims. But criminal
restitution is not the only option. If courts decline to award restitution, child
pornography victims seeking redress can use the civil system to vindicate
191. WOLAK ET AL., supra note 105, at 17.
192. Jdr6me Endrass et al., The consumption of Internet child pornography and violent and sex
offending, BMC PSYCHIATRY, July 14, 2009, at 1, 3, available at http://www.biomedeentral.coml
content/pdf/1471-244X-9-43.pdf.
193. Id. at 6.
194. David Finkelhor & Richard Ormrod, Child Pornography: Patterns from NIBRS, JUVE-
NILE JUSTICE BULLETIN (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Wash., D.C.), Dec. 2004, at 7, available at www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesI/ojjdp/20491 1.pdf. The
authors note that this discrepancy between possession and actual molestation may be a detection
issue. Id.
195. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
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their rights. In cases where district judges reject the restitution claim on
proximate causation grounds, a tort or civil restitution claim may provide
victims with a better remedy, and a better chance of redress, than that of-
fered by a Section 2259 restitution claim.
A. Tort Claims
Child pornography victims who seek recompense from those convicted
of child pornography offenses that do not involve direct abuse would likely
bring a claim in tort alleging intentional or negligent infliction of emotional
distress. These claims encompass wrongful conduct but do not involve
direct contact with the victim. 97
Though civil tort damages have the same types of proximity and cer-
tainty requirements as criminal restitution,' a civil tort suit has two key
advantages over a criminal restitution hearing, both of which make recovery
more likely. First, civil suits allow plaintiffs to present a more complete
case. The criminal restitution process is much less rigorous than is a civil
trial.'9 Unlike a civil plaintiff, a restitution claimant is not a party to the res-
titution hearing and thus has only limited control over the outcome.2(E For
example, criminal restitution claimants have no opportunity to move for
discovery.20' A claimant "cannot control the presentation of evidence during
either the criminal trial or the sentencing hearing and is not even guaranteed
the right to testify about the extent of his losses."202 These procedural dis-
tinctions make it difficult for criminal restitution claimants to present
sufficient evidence of the link between the injury and the particular defen-
dant. One district judge who denied restitution under Section 2259 stated:
"Without more specific evidence, any award in this case would be based on
an 'arbitrary calculation.' The Court does not mean to suggest that restitu-
tion in a possession case will always be an arbitrary calculation. On the
contrary, given more information, a reasonable estimate may be possible."203
196. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) (intentional infliction of emotional
distress); id. § 313 (negligent infliction of emotional distress).
197. See id. §§ 46, 313.
198. For example, "[tihe amount of tort damages for which a negligent party is liable is that
which his or her negligence was a substantial factor in causing." 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 325
(2003). Tort recovery will be barred when "resort to speculation or conjecture is necessary to deter-
mine whether the damage resulted from the unlawful act described in the complaint or from some
other source." Id. § 331. "A tortfeasor is liable only for the damages caused by his or her negligent
or intentional act, and not for damages by separate or intervening causes." Id. § 324.
199. See, e.g., Antonio R. Sarabia II, Practice Tips: Civil Litigators Should Consider Actions
for Criminal Restitution, L.A. LAw., Mar. 1999, at 18, 20-21 (describing the criminal restitution
process in California).
200. See United States v. Brown, 744 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1984).
201. Sarabia, supra note 199.
202. Brown, 744 F.2d at 910.
203. United States v. Patton, No. 09-43 (PAM/JSM), 2010 WL 1006521, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar.
16, 2010) (emphases added) (quoting United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 967 n.14 (9th Cir.
1999)).
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In contrast, the procedural mechanisms of a civil suit will allow plaintiffs to
present the information needed to calculate a reasonable estimate of dam-
ages.
The second advantage of a civil tort suit is that tort law will allow some
measure of damages that would be barred in a criminal restitution claim.
Criminal restitution is limited "to the victim's readily identifiable expenses
and should not be extended to include damages which are difficult to calcu-
late, such as pain and suffering." 204 One district judge who denied a Section
2259 claim emphasized:
Were this a civil tort action, the Victims may have been able to recover for
pain and suffering or some other measure of damages for the anguish they
experience [each time they are notified that another person has been found
in possession of their images]. But "[p]ain and suffering ... and other un-
liquidated damages that are particularly susceptible to arbitrary
determination are usually not included in a restitution order."2 05
Taken together, these two points demonstrate that a claimant who is unable
to prove the certainty and proximity of damages in a criminal restitution
claim may be able to present more complete evidence to the factfinder in a
civil tort suit and recover damages for emotional distress that are otherwise
unrecoverable.
B. Restitution Claims
Alternatively, a certain class of plaintiffs may wish to bring a civil claim
in restitution. This class of plaintiffs includes victims who can more easily
prove a defendant's gain than the defendant's harm to the plaintiff. Section
2259 claimants would likely bring a claim in restitution under section 44 of
the Third Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment and allege in-
terference with a legally protected interest.06 This section allows recovery
from defendants whose tortious conduct resulted in the defendants' unjust
enrichment.20
204. United States v. Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d 182, 192 n.9 (D. Me. 2009).
205. Id. (quoting Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97
HARv. L. REv. 931, 937-38 (1984)) (emphasis added).
206. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 44 (Tentative
Draft No. 4, 2005). A claim under § 44 exists when:
(1) [A] person who obtains a benefit by conscious interference with another's legally pro-
tected interests is accountable to the other for the benefit so obtained, unless competing
legal objectives make such liability inappropriate.
(2) For purposes of subsection (1), conscious interference with a claimant's legally protected
interests may consist of
(a) tortious conduct of which the claimant is the victim, or
(b) a violation of another legal obligation or prohibition, if such violation constitutes
an actionable wrong to the claimant under applicable law.
Id.
207. See id.
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Section 44 claims provide one significant advantage to child pornogra-
phy victims who seek to vindicate their rights in civil court. The "proximate
causation" requirement that has proved so problematic for Section 2259
claimants does not apply, in the same sense, to civil restitution claims. 208
Professor Thompson notes that "[c]ourts in restitution cases impose policy
limits similar to tort 'proximate cause' limitations. Courts, however, must
resist the temptation to transfer to restitution the substance of proximate
cause developed in tort because the policies that underlie the limitations in
each area are entirely different.",2 9 For example, courts often use proximate
cause as a tool to minimize potentially crushing tort liability.210 However,
these policy concerns are not implicated in restitution cases because "the
defendant's gain places a natural ceiling on the amount of recovery."211
Causal limits on restitutionary recovery exist, but these limits are based on
the defendant's gain, not the plaintiff's loss. 212
In a certain set of cases, the differences in causal requirements will make
a restitution claim easier to prove than a tort-based claim. Specific losses are
difficult to prove in child pornography cases because so many different peo-
ple are implicated in the injury. 1 The determination of specific losses will
always be muddied by the losses caused by the original injury and by the
214losses caused by other possessors and distributors of the images. For ex-
ample, the losses sustained by Amy were caused, in large part, by the loss of
earnings that resulted from her inability to finish college."' Amy was unable
to finish college because she watched a movie with her psychology class
that focused on the plight of abused children. 216 It is very difficult to trace
the loss of earnings that resulted from this decision to the hundreds or thou-
sands of people who contributed to Amy's injury.
In contrast, demonstrating the defendant's gain may be relatively simple
in some child pornography cases. The determination of specific gains by the
defendant may be straightforward if, for example, the defendant traded im-
ages of the particular victim for money. Thus, a section 44 claim may
208. See Robert B. Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: A Restitution
Alternative to Tort Damages, 37 VAnD. L. REv. 349, 383 (1984).
209. Id.
210. See id.
211. Id.at384.
212. See id. at 372. One example of a causal limit placed on a restitution claim is that courts
will not ordinarily "require a defendant to return any extraordinary gains attributable to his personal
efforts that were unconnected to the fraud." Id. A person who steals paints and creates a masterpiece
will not be required to turn over the painting or the proceeds from its sale. Id.
213. See, e.g., United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 792 (E.D. Tex. 2009) ("The
losses described in Amy's reports are generalized and caused by her initial abuse as well as the
general existence and dissemination of her pornographic images.").
214. See id.
215. See United States v. Brunner, No. 5:08-CR-16, 2010 WL 148433, at *4-5 (W.D.N.C. Jan.
12, 2010).
216. Id. at *5.
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provide a better chance of proving the causal element of the claim-the
benefit gained-in a limited class of cases.
Plaintiffs suing under section 44 will likely seek a remedy under section
51 of the Third Restatement. Section 51 provides for recovery from defen-
dants who have been enriched by their own misconduct. Section 51
describes the main contours of the provision:
(1) [A] "conscious wrongdoer" is one who acts with knowledge or reason
to know of the underlying wrong.
(3) Unless the rule of subsection (2) imposes a greater liability, the unjust
enrichment of a conscious wrongdoer, or of a defaulting fiduciary without
regard to notice or fault, is the net profit attributable to the underlying
wrong. The object of restitution in such cases is to eliminate any profit
from wrongdoing while avoiding, so far as possible, the imposition of a
penalty. Restitution remedies that pursue this object are often called "dis-
gorgement" or "accounting."21
This section also speaks to the issue of calculating gains. It requires that a
claimant produce evidence "permitting at least a reasonable approximation
of the amount of the wrongful gain."" 8 Any "[r]esidual risk of uncertainty in
calculating net profit is assigned to the wrongdoer."219
The disgorgement remedy described in section 51 may prove advanta-
geous for child pornography victims. As discussed above, proving the
benefit gained by a single defendant may be easier than proving the loss to
the plaintiff. Although the Restatement requires that a claimant prove "what
portion (if any) of the defendants' profits is attributable to the tort,"220 section
51 allows for some flexibility in calculating the gain. The Restatement pro-
vides an example of a situation where 15% of a defendant's underground
storage capacity is situated on the claimant's property."' In this situation, the
claimant is entitled to 15% of defendant's profits from the underground stor-
age. Using similar logic, if 1% of the pornographic photographs on a
website depicted the plaintiff, the plaintiff would be entitled to 1% of the
defendant's profits from that website.
This example brings to light another potential advantage of section 51
recovery. Online child pornography is, sadly, an incredibly profitable
217. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 (Tentative Draft
No. 5, 2007).
218. Id. § 51(4)(d).
219. Id.
220. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 44 cmt. d, illus. 13
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).
221. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 cmt. e (Tentative
Draft No. 5, 2007).
222. Id.
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industry.2 One global child pornography ring had 70,000 subscribers at the
time it was discovered.'2 Such subscribers are willing to pay relatively large
sums of money to access child pornography websites.2 , Victims like Amy,
who are depicted in popular child pornography series, could be entitled to
substantial recovery if they sue in civil court.
Another benefit of the disgorgement remedy provided by section 51 is
that it places the risk of uncertainty in calculating net profits on the defen-
227dant. This provision sidesteps a major problem in Section 2259 claims-
221
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on excessive fines. If a court awards
criminal restitution without a reasonably certain connection between the
particular defendant and the specific losses suffered by the plaintiff, the de-
fendant may end up paying the victim for losses that were caused by
others.229 This presents a problem in a criminal setting but not in a civil set-
230ting.
Thus, a certain subset of plaintiffs would find a civil restitution claim
more advantageous than a tort claim: those plaintiffs who (1) can target a
distributor (or other defendant who has benefitted financially from the illicit
image) and (2) have suffered losses to which many people have contributed,
such that specific losses caused by particular defendants are difficult to as-
certain. These cases will likely involve someone, like Amy, whose images
are part of a popular series that is widely distributed online. In such cases,
the large number of people possessing or distributing the images will muddy
the assessment of specific losses. At the same time, the large number of pos-
sessors and distributors increases the likelihood that at least one defendant
profits substantially from the images. These profits can be captured by a
223. See Andy Gardner, 90 Child Porn Websites Started Every Week, SUNDAY MIRROR (Lon-
don), June 1, 2003, available at 2003 WL 10119599.
224. See Ron Scherer, Child porn rising on Web, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 18, 2005,
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0818/pOlsOl-stct.html.
225. See, e.g., Veronika Oleksyn, Austria says busts of global child porn ring involves 2,360-
plus suspects worldwide, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 7, 2007, available at 2/7/07 APWORLD 10:18:47
(Westlaw) (noting that users of a certain website had to pay eighty-nine dollars to access the mate-
rial); see also Suzanne Smith, Police crack global child porn ring, AuSTL. BROAD. CORP. NEWS,
Mar. 6, 2008, http://www.abc.net.us/news/stories/2008/03/06/2181544.htm (noting that members of
a child pornography ring were willing to pay "hundreds and hundreds of euros" for certain images).
226. Amy's series of images is one of the most widely distributed sets of child pornography
images available online. See Susan Donaldson James, 'Misty Series' Haunts Girl Long After Rape,
ABC NEWS, Feb. 8, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/interenet-pom-misty-series-traumatizes-
child-victim-pedophiles/story?id=9773590.
227. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51(4)(d) (Tentative
Draft No. 5, 2007).
228. See, e.g., United States v. Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d 182, 188 n.5 (D. Me. 2009).
229. See United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 791 (E.D. Tex. 2009) ("A victim is
not necessarily entitled to restitution for all of her losses simply because the victim was harmed and
sustained some lesser loss as a result of a defendant's specific conduct.").
230. The Excessive Fines Clause "limits the government's power to extract payments, wheth-
er in cash or in kind, 'as punishment for some offense.' " Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609-
10 (1993) (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 266, 265 (1989)).
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civil restitution claim without the burden of proving the specific losses
caused by that defendant.
Tort and civil restitution both provide useful avenues to recovery for
child pornography victims who seek to vindicate their rights in the civil sys-
tem. The advantages and disadvantages of each claim will differ depending
on the circumstances of each plaintiff, but it is clear that either area of law
can provide some measure of recovery to victims who have suffered deeply
as the result of the wrongdoing of another.
CONCLUSION
This Note has used traditional common law doctrine of proximate causa-
tion to clarify a novel legal issue: whether, under Section 2259, child
pornography possessors should be liable to the children depicted in the im-
ages they possess.
The Andrews/Cardozo dichotomy provides two different ways of fram-
ing this issue. Andrews's policy-based approach focuses on the need to
cabin the bounds of liability. The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Laney suggested
that such a line-drawing approach is appropriate in the context of Section
2259 claims. Given the serious administrative concerns these claims present,
this Note agrees that drawing the line at child pornography possession on
policy grounds would be appropriate. Cardozo's conception of proximate
cause, by contrast, revolves around a specific relationship between the of-
fender and the victim. By analyzing the nature of the relationship presented
by Section 2259 claims, this Note explores the reasons for the criminaliza-
tion of child pornography possession and whether the offense of child
pornography possession is primarily designed to protect society or the indi-
vidual depicted children. Though there are powerful arguments on both
sides, this Note agrees with Judge Posner that the offense of child pornogra-
phy possession is meant to protect society as a whole. Drawing an analogy
to the republication of defamatory statements-where readers of the de-
famatory statement are not liable to the defamed person-this Note suggests
that, in the chain of production, distribution, and consumption of material
that itself harms an individual, the end consumers are not and should not be
liable to that individual. This indicates that child pornography is criminal-
ized because of society's moral repugnance toward those people who are
interested in child pornography and because of a sneaking suspicion that
such people pose a threat to society. If child pornography is indeed a socie-
tal harm, rather than an individualized harm, then this conclusion undercuts
the type of relationship necessary to establish proximate causation under the
Cardozo framework.
Finally, this Note argues that child pornography victims should vindicate
their rights in the civil system. Tort claims and civil restitution claims both
provide distinct advantages over criminal restitution claims. In the civil sys-
tem, child pornography victims will be able to gain some measure of redress
for the immense harms they have suffered.
1361May 2011]
1362 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 109:1327
